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Abstract
We provide a necessary condition for optimal commodity taxes when agents differ
according to labor skill and consumption tastes and when the government can also use
a general nonlinear tax on labor income. The discouragement index of commodities
is shown to be the sum of (1) the distributive factors over the different income classes
and (2) the excess demand of mimickers. The first component arises whenever there
is taste heterogeneity within income classes. The second one arises whenever there is
taste heterogeneity between income classes. In an empirical application from Cana-
dian microdata we delineate groups of households with homogeneous tastes based on
nonviolation of revealed preferences. Assuming that indirect taxes are set optimally,
we identify the relevant incentive constraints and provide estimates for social values
of the different groups. Redistribution from indirect taxes favors households living in
rural Quebec.
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1 Introduction
In order to ease the fiscal burden on those in need the common practice is to exempt
necessities or to tax them at a lower rate than luxuries. Whether commodity taxes should
contribute to the progressivity of the overall tax system is however a continued debate in
public finance. In a first-best environment indirect taxes are useless and one can conciliate
efficiency and equity considerations by appealing to personalized lump-sum income transfers
only. It is nevertheless difficult to think about any circumstances where the tax authority
could actually use such income transfers. More plausibly the demanding informational
requirements of the first-best instead will be not met. In the absence of a general nonlinear
income tax the second-best consists to set commodity taxes according to the many-person
Ramsey rule derived by Diamond and Mirrlees [15]. This rule recommends to discourage
less heavily the demand for the goods preferred by less well-off persons. Its appeal is
profoundly affected by the possibility to use a general nonlinear income tax. Atkinson and
Stiglitz [2] and Mirrlees [23] and [24] have indeed found that the only role of commodity
taxation then amounts to relax incentive constraints. Consider for instance a redistribution
from high to low labor skill persons. When labor skill is private information a high tax on
necessities that would discourage high skill workers to reduce labor effort may be socially
desirable. In fact this happens whenever high skill workers who provide low labor effort
consume more necessities than the low skilled. Of course low skilled suffer from the high
tax burden but they also gain from a greater scope for redistribution of income. There
is suspicion that this narrow role for commodity taxes relates to the fact that labor skill
is the only dimension in which agents differ, and that consumption taste heterogeneity on
top of labor skill could save some version of the many-person Ramsey rule. The purpose of
our paper is to discuss the respective roles of direct nonlinear income taxation and indirect
linear uniform commodity taxation when agents differ according to both labor skill and
consumption tastes.
Much effort has been done in the recent literature to examine the optimal shape of
commodity taxes when individuals differ along two dimensions that are private information
to the agents. See especially Cremer, Pestieau and Rochet [9], Cremer, Pestieau and Rochet
[10], Saez [25], Diamond [13], Blomquist and Christiansen [4], Kaplow [19], Diamond and
Spinnewijn [16] and Golosov, Troshkin, Tsyvinski and Weinzierl [21]. This literature shows
that the role of commodity taxes identified by Atkinson and Stiglitz [2] and Mirrlees [24] is
still at work in this more general framework. So far there is therefore no clear justification
for an heavy taxation of luxuries.
The closest papers to ours are Cremer, Pestieau and Rochet [9] and Diamond and
Spinnewijn [16]. Using a Lagrangian approach Cremer, Pestieau and Rochet [9] derive
an optimal rule where commodity taxes only depend on the ‘incremental net demand of
mimickers’ defined as the difference between the consumption of mimickers and mimicked
agents. As in Atkinson and Stiglitz [2] and Mirrlees [24] the demand for a given commodity
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should be discouraged when the mimickers consume more of this commodity than the
mimicked persons. For instance groceries should be taxed when the richest display a strong
enough preference for this category of goods: even with a lower income these persons
would still have a relatively high consumption of groceries. In order to study the role
of heterogeneity of tastes at a given earning level and to provide a detailed analysis of
the relevant incentive constraints, Diamond and Spinnewijn [16] consider an occupation
setup where labor income is determined by the occupation independently of consumption
tastes. Assuming that high income earners who have high discount rate are ready to
imitate low income earners, the ‘incremental net demand of mimickers’ device recommends
to subsidy savings of low income earners. A particular feature of the optimal tax system
in Diamond and Spinnewijn [16] is to involve a tax on savings of high income earners
that complements this subsidy on the less well-off agents. Diamond and Spinnewijn [16]
interpret this additional tax as a second manner to relax incentive constraints. Indeed a
tax on savings of the richest redistributes welfare from the richest patient to the richest
impatient agents, and so raises the welfare of the potential mimickers (the richest impatient
agents) if they do not relax labor effort.
Our paper shows that this tax on savings of the richest in fact is part of a many-person
Ramsey rule. The intuition is simple. When there is a limited number of occupations
relatively to the total number of different types, some agents with different tastes must be
clustered within the same income class. The income tax can only be used to handle with
heterogeneity between income classes, but it is useless for achieving a finer redistribution
within income classes. This is a role devoted to commodity taxation. Within a given
income class or occupation, or equivalently in the presence of bunching where different types
of agents have after-tax income, incentive problems become irrelevant: commodity taxes
depend on the relationship between the individual consumption and the social valuation of
the consumers.
We use a method closely related to Cremer, Pestieau and Rochet [9] in an occupation
setup that generalizes Diamond and Spinnewijn [16]. Unlike Cremer, Pestieau and Rochet
[9] we solve for a dual program allowing for a separate treatment of commodity taxes and
occupation and labor decisions, as in Laroque [20] and Gauthier and Laroque [18]. The
program yields a necessary condition for indirect taxes to be optimal given any arbitrary
distribution of before-tax income. This condition can be written in two alternative ways.
The first writing coincides with the standard many-person Ramsey rule provided that
agents’ social weights are suitably redefined. Following Diamond [12] the social weight
of an agent usually equals the change in social welfare that would result from an income
transfer toward this agent in the absence of incentive considerations. In our setup this
weight also integrates a component related to incentives. Indeed an income transfer makes
more difficult to discourage all the agents who are initially tempted by the allocation
designed for those benefiting from the transfer. From an incentive viewpoint it would
instead be better to lower income transfers to envied (mimicked) agents. The relevant
3
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weight in the many-person Ramsey rule is the sum of the ‘intrinsic’ social weight used by
Diamond [12] and a negative component due to incentive issues. This ‘consolidated’ social
weight is therefore below the intrinsic one when incentive considerations matter. It might
even be negative, as is sometimes found in the empirical literature estimating these weights
from many-person Ramsey rules (see, e.g., Ahmad and Stern [1]).
The second writing follows from a decomposition of these two parts. This gives a new
formulation for the optimal rule of indirect taxation that mixes a many-person Ramsey
rule over the usual Diamond [12] intrinsic social weights, and an incentive component
function of the incremental net demand of mimickers. This formulation shows that the
usefulness of indirect taxes relates to taste heterogeneity in two different ways. On the one
hand, indirect taxes are shaped by a many-person Ramsey rule when agents within the
same income class have different consumption tastes. On the other hand, indirect taxes
are also useful when agents in different income classes have also different tastes: indirect
taxes then allow to relax incentive constraints. In view of the many-person Ramsey rule
component the consumption of those who have low intrinsic weights can be discouraged,
even in the presence of a general nonlinear income tax. Commodity taxation then reinforces
the progressivity of the tax system by managing within income class taste heterogeneity,
while the income tax is concerned by between class income (cross-sectional) heterogeneity.
In an empirical illustration from Canadian consumption microdata we identify groups
of agents who have the same preferences for consumption by appealing to Crawford and
Pendakur [8]. They provide a method that clusters household observations consistent with
the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preferences. We find that taste heterogeneity matters
but that few groups are enough to give an account of most of the data.
Assuming that the Federal Good and Services Tax (GST) is optimally set is then used
to give estimates for the social weights of the different groups based on the rules derived
in our theoretical model. We provide evidence that consolidated social weights vary with
taste groups. They are negative for low levels of education childless or single parent rural
families living in West Canada.
Recovering the intrinsic social weights requires identifying the relevant incentive con-
straints. The existing empirical literature offers several several tests for the presence of
asymmetric information. These tests usually rely on the comparison between market out-
comes with and without asymmetric information (see Chiappori and Salanie´ [7] and Finkel-
stein and McGarry [17]). We need however a much more precise information about the
pattern of incentives. We use a simple new argument for identifying the binding incentive
constraints, based on a direct measure of the Lagrange multipliers associated with these
constraints. We find that incentive problems are mostly concentrated on households whose
consolidated social weights are negative. The negative consolidated social weights found for
these categories thus underestimate their intrinsic weights. The bias appears large enough
for all the intrinsic weights to be actually positive. In general redistribution implied by the
GST favors the poorest households within each taste group, while redistribution between
4
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taste groups favors households living in rural Quebec.
2 General setup
We consider a population of agents varying in labor skill i (i = 1, . . . , I) and consumption
tastes j (j = 1, . . . , J). There are nij type ij agents and the total population size is
normalized to 1. The preferences of a ij agent are represented by the utility function
Ui(Vj(x), y) where x is a bundle of N commodities and y is a nonnegative real number which
stands for before-tax labor income. Preferences embody separability between labor income
and consumption, which allows for a clear distinction between labor skill and consumption
tastes. There is heterogeneity in consumption tastes when the subutility Vj varies with j.
The functions Ui and Vj have standard monotony and convexity properties.
The government observes individual income and aggregate consumption for every good.
Labor skill i and consumption tastes j are private information to the agent. The tax tools
available to the government consist of a nonlinear income taxes and a set of linear consump-
tion taxes. Consumption goods are produced from labor according to a linear technology
associated with a given vector of N producer prices p. The vector of N consumption taxes
is q− p where q is the vector of consumer prices. An agent with before-tax labor income y
earns R(y) as after-tax labor income.
Following Diamond [14] and Diamond and Spinnewijn [16] income heterogeneity pro-
ceeds through the existence of occupations (or jobs) indexed by k (k = 1, . . . , K). All the
agents in occupation k earn the same before-tax income yk and are subject to the same
earnings tax rate, with Rk = R(yk) as after-tax income. The standard taxation setup
obtains when K = IJ , i.e., there are as many possible occupations as individual types. In
the sequel we assume that K ≤ IJ .
Given (y,R) a ij agent chooses a consumption bundle maximizing Vj(x) subject to the
budget constraint q · x ≤ R. The solution to this problem is a bundle ξj(q, R) yielding
(conditional) indirect subutility Vj(ξj(q, R)) ≡ Vj(q, R) from consumption, with a slight
abuse of notation.
A ij agent in occupation k has therefore utility Ui(Vj(q, Rk), yk). She self-selects into
occupation k if and only if
Ui(Vj(q, Rk), yk) ≥ Ui(Vj(q, Rk′), yk′) (1)
for all k′.
A tax system is defined by a vector q consisting of N consumer prices, an income tax
profile (yk, Rk) for k = 1, . . . , K, and an allocation rule assigning every type of agent to
some occupation. The allocation rule is defined as a profile (µijk) where µijk is 1 if ij agents
are assigned to occupation k, and is 0 otherwise.
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A tax system is feasible if∑
ijk
nijµijk [(q − p) · ξj(q, Rk) + (yk −Rk)] ≥ 0.
It satisfies incentive compatibility if (1) holds for each type ij and each pair of occupations
k and k′ such that µijk = 1.
3 A dual program
Consider some reference tax system ((µ¯ijk), q¯, (y¯k, R¯k)) satisfying incentive compatibility
(1) and feasibility requirements (2). This section derives a necessary condition for q¯ and
(R¯k) to be optimal, given (µ¯ijk) and (y¯k). For convenience, let V¯jk ≡ Vj(q¯, R¯k) be the
subutility that a type ij agent obtains when facing the reference tax system. Let also
njk ≡
∑
i
nijµ¯ijk
be the number of taste j agents in occupation k.
Suppose that the economy is locally nonsatiated when facing the reference tax system:
some additional resources could be used to achieve a Pareto improvement without violating
incentive compatibility requirements. Given the assignment (µ¯ijk) and before-tax income
levels (y¯k), the tax tools (q, (Rk)) = (q¯, (R¯k)) must locally solve the program P that consists
to maximize the total amount of collected resources∑
jk
njk [(q − p) · ξj(q, Rk) + (y¯k −Rk)]
subject to
Vj(q, Rk) ≥ V¯jk (2)
for all ijk such that µ¯ijk = 1, and
Vj(q, Rk) ≤ V¯jk (3)
for all ijk Ui(V¯jk, y¯k) = Ui(V¯jk′ , y¯k′) and µ¯ijk′ = 1 for some k
′ 6= k.
If there were some (q, (Rk)) different from (q¯, (R¯k)) solution to P , there would exist
another tax system satisfying incentive constraints and yielding a higher amount of collected
tax. The nonsatiation hypothesis would imply suboptimality of (q¯, (R¯k)).
The JK constraints (2) ensure that not agent suffers from the implementation of the new
taxes (q, (Rk)). The constraints (3) maintain local incentive compatibility. Consider indeed
a ij agent allocated to some occupation k′ different from k who contemplates switching to
occupation k. It follows from (2) that her welfare when she remains in her own occupation
6
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k′ is greater when she faces the new taxes (q, (Rk)) than the reference taxes (q¯, (R¯k)). The
constraints (3) therefore ensure that the deviation cannot be made profitable. Of course
as soon as some type ij agent assigned to occupation k′ is ready to switch to occupation
k in the reference situation, both (2) and (3) have to hold simultaneously for tastes j and
occupation k: the subutility obtained by a type ij agent assigned to occupation k then
cannot change, Vj(q, (Rk)) = Vj(q¯, (R¯k)).
Note that the constraints (3) only involve types ij and occupations corresponding to
active incentive constraints in the reference situation: if no taste j agent contemplates
deviating to occupation k, Vj(q, Rk) could be set below V¯jk without violating incentive
constraints.
Remark 1. The program P assumes that all the agents with the same type are assigned to
the same occupation. If agents with the same type were assigned to different occupations,
then both (2) and (3) should hold for this type.
Remark 2. Suppose that in the reference situation agents are bunched into K ′ < K
income classes. Since (y¯k) and (µ¯ijk) are given in P , all the agents with the same before-
tax income must have the same after-tax income (otherwise incentive constraints would
be violated). Hence the government in fact can use at most K ′ different after-tax income
levels and there is no loss to set K = K ′. This shows that an occupation can be thought
of as an income class.
We solve P by appealing to Lagrangian methods. This requires qualification of the
(active) constraints in the reference situation (Simon and Blume [26]).
Assumption 1. The constraints of program P active at (q¯, (R¯k)) are qualified: the JK ×
(N +K) Jacobian matrix whose jkth row is ∇Vj(q¯, (R¯k)) has rank JK.
Assumption 1 requires that (J−1)K ≤ N , i.e., a large enough number of taxable goods
relatively to agents’ heterogeneity. Under this assumption there are nonnegative Lagrange
multipliers λjk and γjk associated with (2) and (3) such that a solution to P is a local
extremum of∑
jk
njk (t · ξj(q, Rk)−Rk) +
∑
jk
njkλjk
[
Vj(q, Rk)− V¯jk
]
+
∑
jk
n˜jkγjk
[
V¯jk − Vj(q, Rk)
]
,
where
nj ≡
∑
k
njk and n˜jk ≡
∑
i
∑
k′ 6=k
nijµ¯ijk′1
[
Ui(V¯jk′ , y¯k′) = Ui(V¯jk, y¯k)
]
are respectively the number of taste j agents in the economy and the number of taste j
agents assigned to occupation k′ 6= k who contemplate switching to occupation k.
7
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4 A many-person Ramsey rule
Let ξhjk ≡ ξhj (q¯, R¯k) be the demand for good h by a ij agent in occupation k in the reference
situation. The tax system ((µ¯ijk), q¯, (y¯k, R¯k)) is optimal only if the first-order condition in
the consumer price qh of good h,
∑
jk
njk
(
ξhjk +
∑
`
t`
∂ξ`jk
∂qh
)
−
∑
jk
njkλjkαjkξ
h
jk +
∑
jk
n˜jkγjkαjkξ
h
jk = 0,
is satisfied.
The value of a one unit of income transfer toward a taste j agent assigned to occupation
k is
βjk =
∑
`
t`
∂ξ`jk
∂R
+ λjkαjk. (4)
The value of βjk measures the ‘intrinsic’ social weight of a taste j agent assigned to occu-
pation k. This is the marginal social valuation of an income transfer in the absence of any
incentive problems involving this agent.
The value of the same transfer, designed to a taste j agent in occupation k, but that
would also benefit to a taste j agent allocated to some other occupation k′ 6= k when she
switches to occupation k is
β˜jk = γjkαjk. (5)
It follows that the total social value of a one unit of income transfer toward each taste
j agent in occupation k is
bjk = njkβjk − n˜jkβ˜jk. (6)
This ‘consolidated’ social weight bjk equals the ‘intrinsic’ social weight net of the incentive
correction β˜jk.
Appealing to the Slutsky properties, the first-order condition in qh can be written
∑
`
t`
∂ξˆh
∂q`
= −ξh +
∑
jk
bjkξ
h
jk (7)
where
ξh ≡
∑
jk
njkξ
h
jk
represents the aggregate demand for good h, and ξˆh is the aggregate compensated demand
for this good. Using the first-order condition in the after-tax income chosen for occupation
k, ∑
j
bjk =
∑
j
njk ≡ nk, (8)
8
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the first-order condition in qh finally yields a first necessary condition for optimal commod-
ity taxes.
Proposition 1. Suppose that Assumption 1 is satisfied. Consider some assignment (µ¯ijk),
a vector of consumer prices q¯ and an income tax schedule (y¯k, R¯k) satisfying incentive
compatibility and feasibility requirements. Then, given (µ¯ijk) and (y¯k), the optimal indirect
taxes must satisfy ∑
`
t`
∂ξˆh
∂q`
=
∑
k
nkΦ
h
k (9)
where
Φhk ≡
∑
j
bjk
nk
ξhjk −
∑
j
njk
nk
ξhjk = cov
(
bjk
njk
, ξhjk
)
.
The covariance Φhk is positive when agents in occupation k who have a high consolidated
social weight like good h. The rule (9) fits a many-person Ramsey rule formulation. In the
standard many-person Ramsey rule the intrinsic replace the consolidated social weights.
Here social values are adjusted downward because an income transfer toward agents in
occupation k makes this occupation more desirable to the other agents, and so tightens
incentive constraints. This might contribute to explain why the social values recovered
from the many-person Ramsey rule are sometimes found to be negative in the empirical
literature. In our illustration in section 5 consolidated social values are negative for some
groups of agents.
The above formulation possibly involves hypothetical consumption levels of mimickers.
One can however isolate the own impact of effective consumption heterogeneity on com-
modity taxes. This requires to disentangle the positive impact of an income transfer toward
agents in occupation k (whose welfare increases) and the negative impact coming from a
tightening of incentive constraints. To this aim we exploit the linearity properties of the
covariance operator to the expression of bjk given in (6):
Φhk = cov
(
βjk, ξ
h
jk
)− cov( n˜jk
njk
β˜jk, ξ
h
jk
)
,
where
cov
(
βjk, ξ
h
jk
) ≡ φhk = ∑
j
njk
nk
βjkξ
h
jk −
∑
j
njk
nk
βjk
∑
j
njk
nk
ξhjk (10)
is the distributive factor of good h advocated by Diamond [12], here computed within
occupation k. Similarly,
cov
(
n˜jk
njk
β˜jk, ξ
h
jk
)
=
∑
j
n˜jk
nk
β˜jk
(
ξhjk − ξhk
)
9
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where
ξhk ≡
∑
j
njk
nk
ξhjk
is the average (actual) demand for good h within occupation k. Recall that n˜jkβ˜jk is 0
when no taste j agent in occupation k′ 6= k contemplates switching to occupation k in
the reference situation. A type ij in occupation k′ would get the subutility Vj(q, Rk) in
occupation k and thus would have the same consumption ξhjk as a taste j agent initially
assigned to occupation k. The covariance in (4) thus appears as a weighted sum of the
differences between the fictitious consumption of good h from agents who contemplate
switching to job k and the actual consumption of this same good by agents allocated to
job k in the reference situation. This is the ‘incremental demand of the mimickers’ used by
Cremer, Pestieau and Rochet [9].
Proposition 1 can then be rewritten in the following way:
Proposition 2. Suppose that Assumption 1 is satisfied. Consider some assignment (µ¯ijk),
a vector of consumer prices q¯ and an income tax schedule (y¯k, R¯k) satisfying incentive
compatibility and feasibility requirements. Then, given (µ¯ijk) and (y¯k), the optimal indirect
taxes must satisfy ∑
`
t`
∂ξˆh
∂q`
=
∑
k
nkφ
h
k −
∑
jk
n˜jkβ˜jk
(
ξhjk − ξhk
)
, (11)
where φhk is the within occupation k distributive factor for good h.
1. Incentive considerations are irrelevant when there is only one occupation k = K = 1.
We have β˜jk = 0 for all jk. The income tax degenerates to a uniform lump-sum tax
and the optimal rule for indirect taxation given in Proposition 2 simplifies as∑
`
t`
∂ξˆh
∂q`
=
∑
k
nkφ
h
k = φ
h
1 .
This is the familiar many-person Ramsey rule. The discouragement of compensated
demand for good h should equal to the distributive factor of this good. Indirect
taxation is useful as far as there is taste heterogeneity within the (unique) income
class.
2. When there are IJ occupations, each type ij can be viewed as assigned to occupation
k = ij. We have then φhk = 0 for all h and k, and the optimal rule for indirect taxation
given in (11) becomes ∑
`
t`
∂ξˆh
∂q`
= −
∑
jk
n˜jkβ˜jk
(
ξhjk − ξhk
)
. (12)
10
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The discouragement only relies on the incremental net demand of the mimickers,
as in Mirrlees [24], Guesnerie [22], Cremer, Pestieau and Rochet [9] and [10]. The
formula (11) also applies when tastes are perfectly correlated with skill, as in Golosov,
Troshkin, Tsyvinski and Weinzierl [21]. Indirect taxation is useless when no agent
contemplates switching to another occupation in the reference situation (β˜jk = 0 for
all jk). It is also useless in the homogeneous taste case, i.e., Vj(x) = V (x), so that
ξhjk = ξ
h
k , which yields the Atkinson and Stiglitz [2] theorem. The role of indirect
taxes in (12) is bound to relax incentive constraints. This is possible when agents
in different income classes have also different consumption tastes. When β˜jk > 0 for
some jk, consumption of a given good h should be discouraged when agents who
contemplate switching to occupation k have a higher consumption of this good than
agents in occupation k.
The considerations coming from these two polar cases mix together in a surprisingly
simple manner in the more general configuration where 1 ≤ K ≤ IJ . The optimal discour-
agement should then equal the sum of distributive factors over the different income classes
and the measure of the excess consumption of mimickers.
In each configuration nonlinear income taxes handle with heterogeneity of agents be-
tween occupations. Proposition 2 highlights that (nonuniform) indirect taxes are useful in
two kinds of circumstances. First they contribute to deal with equity when individuals allo-
cated to the same income class have different consumption tastes. Then they allow the tax
authority to manage within income class heterogeneity through a many-person Ramsey-like
rule. Second, they ensure relaxation of incentive constraints when individuals allocated to
different income classes have different tastes, i.e., in the presence of cross-sectional taste
heterogeneity.
Proposition 2 makes clear that indirect taxes should be partly designed to reinforce the
progressivity of the tax system. However one cannot expect that luxuries be more heavily
taxed than necessities, even if agents who like luxuries have lower intrinsic weights, because
the impact of taste heterogeneity between income classes may overcome taste heterogeneity
within income classes.
5 An empirical illustration
We use Canadian consumption microdata to delineate groups of agents who have similar
consumption tastes and to estimate the consolidated social values (bjk). We provide a
simple method to identify the relevant incentive constraints. This yields separate estimates
for the incentive corrections (β˜jk) and the intrinsic social weights (βjk).
11
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5.1 Data, consumption and taxes
The data comes from the Survey of Family Spending (for years 1992, 1996, 1997, and 1998)
and the Survey of Household Spending (for every year from 1999 to 2008) collected by
Statistics Canada.1 Annual surveys comprise from 8,624 to 16,461 observations, yielding
a 14 year pooled sample of 183,971 observations at the household level. One observation
gives the amounts spent by an household on 13 aggregate COICOP categories of goods
(Food expenditures, Alcoholic beverages, Clothing, Housing, Furnishings and equipment,
Health care, Public and Private Transportation, Communication, Education, Recreation,
Restaurants, and a Miscellaneous Goods and Services category).2 Price indices are drawn
from Statistics Canada’s Consumer Price Index. They are harmonized across provinces
using the 2008 Inter-city Indexes of Consumer Price Levels. They are computed at the
category × province × year level.
Canada appeals to both a federal Goods and Services Tax (GST) and local commodity
taxes. Some provinces set local taxes in accordance with the GST within the framework of
an Harmonized Sales Tax (HST). Others may have provincial or retail sales tax on top of the
GST. In this illustration we mostly focus our attention on the federal redistributive stance,
taking as given local taxes. We thus ignore possible vertical interactions between different
levels of governments. The GST was enacted in 1991 at a rate of 7% through legislative
arrangements promoted by Brian Mulroney and part of the Progressive Conservative party,
but disapproved by other right-wing Members of Parliament, as well as the Liberal party
and most of the population. The Conservative Party subsequently lowered the GST rate
to 6% in 2006 and to 5% in 2008.
The GST applies to the supply of most goods and services, except basic groceries such
as milk, bread, vegetables, meat, agricultural or fishery products, and also most of health
and education related expenditures. In this illustration, we consider that all goods are
subject to GST, except the whole Food, Health and Education categories that are assumed
tax-free. It is likely that the available aggregate categories in fact include both taxed and
zero-rated or exempted items.
5.2 Revealed preferences taste groups
The identification of the groups of households who have the same consumption tastes uses
the revealed preference based methodology used by Crawford and Pendakur [8]. We use the
revealedPrefs algorithm developed by Boelaert [6] to perform Crawford and Pendakur
1Details about the database and cleaning procedure can be found in Boelaert [5].
2The United Nations Statistics Division provides details about the different categories available online
at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=5Lg=1. The 02 Alcoholic beverages cat-
egory also comprises Tobacco and Narcotics. Water supply, electricity, gas and other fuels are included into
the 04 Housing category. The 07 Transport category is splitted into Private and Public transportation.
The latter corresponds to the 07.3 Transport services COICOP subcategory.
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clustering of the data. This yields groups of households who do not violate the Generalized
Axiom of Revealed Preferences. Households from the same group have the same preferences
and the same demand functions. The algorithm is computationally demanding. For this
reason we have worked with a random sub-sample of 100,000 observations from our initial
sample. We find that taste heterogeneity does matter but that a limited number of groups
is enough to rationalize the data.3 The three groups with most observations comprise about
one-third of the sample. In the sequel we only consider these three taste groups.
There are 12, 756 observations in taste group 1, 8, 573 in taste group 2, and 6, 880 in
taste group 3. Detailed characteristics about these groups are given in Appendix A and B.
Taste 1 group comprises households whose consumption pattern is similar to the one of a
household with intermediate education, and living in rural areas in Quebec. Households in
this group have relatively large spending on the Furnishings and equipment and Recreation
categories. Taste 2 group consists of tenants or mortgaged owners, with high education,
living in urban areas of Ontario. This is the richest group of our sample. A larger income
share is devoted to Housing and Restaurants categories. Finally, in taste 3 group, one
finds households with low education, living in urban areas of British Columbia or Prairies
regions. These are the poorest households of our sample. They consume relatively more
Private transport, Alcohol and education categories.
5.3 Social weight estimates
Assuming that the GST rates are set optimally, the best estimates for the profile of social
weights (bjk) must satisfy the first-order conditions (6) and (7). The first-order condition
(7) associated with category h can be rewritten∑
`
t`
q`
εˆh` = −1 +
∑
jk
bjk
ξhjk
ξh
,
where
εˆh` =
∑
jk
njk
ξhjk
ξh
εˆh`jk (13)
is the price elasticity of compensated aggregate demand for category h with respect to
consumer price q`, and
εˆh`jk =
q`
ξhjk
∂ξˆhjk
∂q`
.
In addition, from (6), we have
b1k =
∑
j
njk −
∑
j≥2
bjk ≡ nk −
∑
j≥2
bjk (14)
3We find that 77 taste groups rationalize the whole 100,000 observations dataset: only 8 groups are
enough to rationalize 50% of the data, 18 for 75% of the data, and 32 for 90% of the data.
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for all income class k. The best estimates (b∗jk) for consolidated social weights of taste
groups j ≥ 2 is a profile (bjk) minimizing(∑
`
t`
q`
(∑
jk
njk
qhξhjk
qhξh
εˆh`jk
)
+ 1−
∑
k
nk
qhξh1k
qhξh
−
∑
k
∑
j≥2
bjk
qhξhjk − qhξh1k
qhξh
)2
. (15)
The estimate (b∗1k) for consolidated social weights of taste group 1 then obtain from (14).
In (15) the ad valorem taxes t`/q` are set to the mean GST rate over time for all taxed
categories, and is 0 for untaxed categories (Food, Health, and Education). For simplicity
we consider K = 2 income classes comprising households whose income (total expenditure)
is below or above the median Canadian income. Annual income is between 133 and 36, 260
CAD in the lower class, and between 36, 260 and 354, 206 CAD in the upper class. There
are therefore 6 different groups characterized by their consumption tastes j = 1, 2, 3 and
their income class k = 1, 2.
We have a system of 13 + 2 = 15 equations (there are 13 categories of good and 2
income classes) to recover the 6 consolidated social weights (bjk). In the sequel, however,
we disregard the first-order condition (7) associated with Alcohol, since taxes on alcohol
depend not only on efficiency/equity matters, but also on e.g., public health considerations.
The data gives the amount (qhξhjk) spent on every category h (in CAD) for every group
jk. We obtain the price elasticities of compensated demand from the estimation of an
Almost Ideal Demand System. Table 1 reports for every jk the ratio b∗jk/njk that minimizes
(15) subject to (14).4 This ratio measures the gross social value (in CAD) of a transfer of
1 CAD to one individual in the jk group. It is greater than 1 when it is socially profitable
to transfer 1 dollar to one such individual. The first row of Table 1 gives the social values
estimated from the whole sample. Tastes of group 1 appear socially favored while tastes
of group 3 are socially penalized. The society seems to be about neutral regarding taste
group 2.
In the second and third rows of Table 1 the tax rate is set to the mean GST rate over
the years where the Prime Minister is from the Conservative Party (1993, 2006, 2007, and
2008) and from the Liberal Party (1992, and every year from 1996 to 2005), respectively.
The same general pattern as in the whole sample continues to hold in the two sub-samples.
Conservative Party possibly puts less weight than the Liberal Party on low income earners
of taste group 2 and more weight on those of taste group 3.
4The value of (15) at (b∗jk) is 0.46. This represents only 9.5% of the average value of (15) obtained from
50, 000 random draws with (bjk) between −1 and 2. The algorithm thus performs well. Table 6 in the
appendix provides a decomposition of the total residual per category. Most of the residual in fact concerns
Education: equity and efficiency considerations are not enough to justify exemption of Education from the
GST base.
14
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Table 1: consolidated social weights
b∗jk/njk (in Canadian Dollars)
Taste group j 1 2 3
Income class k Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Whole sample 1.93 1.65 0.96 0.94 −0.67 −0.12
Conservative Party 2.04 1.67 0.31 0.87 0.10 −0.09
Liberal Party 2.02 1.84 0.75 0.63 −0.67 −0.07
5.4 Incentive pattern and intrinsic social values
Intrinsic social weights (measured by βjk) equal bjk/njk if and only if group jk is not envied
by another group (n˜jk is 0 in (6)). When n˜jk > 0, intrinsic social weights are blurred by
incentive considerations. In this section we appeal to Assumption 1 to isolate the intrinsic
component. Suppose that n˜jkγjk > 0. By Assumption 1 it must be that (2) is inactive for
taste j agents in occupation k. Indeed both (2) and (3) cannot be active without violating
qualification. We have therefore:
Identifying Assumption. Under Assumption 1, n˜jkγjk > 0⇒ λjk = 0.
We now proceed by contradiction in order to identify the pattern of relevant incentive
constraints. Assume that agents of group jk are envied:
n˜jkγjk > 0. (16)
It follows that λjk = 0 and by (4) the intrinsic social weight of an agent of group jk is
βjk =
∑
`
t`
∂ξhjk
∂Rk
. (17)
Using (6) then yields
n˜jkγjk = njk
∑
`
t`
∂ξhjk
∂Rk
− bjk. (18)
Table 2 reports the values of n˜jkγjk for every jk obtained from (18) with (bjk) replaced by
the estimates (b∗jk) given in Table 1, computing the income effect consistent with an AIDS
formulation. When the value is found negative, the assumption that jk is envied is falsified
and the incentive constraints involving group jk must be slack (n˜jkγjk = 0).
Table 2 shows that incentive considerations do not matter within taste group 1. The
estimated social weights b∗1k reported in Table 1 thus give estimates for the intrinsic social
15
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Table 2: Incentive correction
n˜jkβ˜jk (in Canadian Dollars)
Taste group j 1 2 3
Income class k Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Whole sample −0.29 −0.21 −0.04 −0.04 0.18 0.09
Conservative Party −0.24 −0.31 0.03 −0.06 0.06 0.10
Liberal Party −0.33 −0.23 0.001 0.01 0.18 0.08
values β1k/n1k for the two income classes. To some extent this also applies to taste group
2 (the values for n˜2kβ˜2k stand very close to 0). Incentives clearly do matter within taste
group 3.
When incentive constraints bind for a group jk, the intrinsic social weight must be
computed from (17). The corrected weights are given in Table 3.
Table 3: Intrinsic social weights
βjk (in Canadian Dollars)
Taste group j 1 2 3
Income class k Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Whole sample 1.93 1.65 0.96 0.94 0.73 0.67
Conservative Party 2.04 1.67 0.61 0.87 0.61 0.56
Liberal Party 2.02 1.84 0.75 0.70 0.76 0.69
The intrinsic social weights are consistent with a Paretian social welfare function (βjk >
0 for all jk). A group is socially favored when βjk > 1 and socially penalized otherwise.
Redistribution revealed from federal GST rates shows that taste group 1 is socially favored
while taste groups 2 and 3 are socially penalized. In general the social value is greater for
low income earners than high income earners in a given taste group, and redistribution
toward the less well off households is magnified under the Liberals.5
Remark 3. We have considered that the federal level takes local taxes as given. If one
assumes instead that the federal stance takes into account the change in local commodity
5The results are about unaffected if the reference is an adult equivalent instead of an household. Ap-
pendix E provides estimated social weights for renormalized consumption expenditures using standard
equivalent scales.
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taxes that results from an adjustment in the GST rate, for instance through the (HST)
harmonization settlement, then the sum of the federal and provincial tax rates is better
suited for the analysis. Reproducing the same analysis with the GST rate replaced by the
total (federal and provincial) tax rate yields intrinsic social weights given in Table 4. The
pattern of relevant incentive constraints is unchanged (see Tables 9 in Appendix D), with
incentive difficulties still concentrated within taste group 3. Taste groups 2 and 3 still have
lower social values than taste group 1, but, absent from incentive issues, indirect taxes now
would make income transfers socially desirable for every group.
Table 4: Intrinsic social weights from federal and provincial taxes
βjk (in Canadian Dollars)
Taste group j 1 2 3
Income class k Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Whole sample 1.84 1.47 1.33 1.40 1.30 1.20
Conservative Party 2.09 1.52 1.17 1.22 1.18 1.09
Liberal Party 1.91 1.75 1.32 1.24 1.33 1.23
5.5 Discouragement and incentives
The impact of incentive constraints on Canadian indirect taxes depends on incentives
through the demand of taste group 3 mimickers. If their consumption is close to the
average consumption, then indirect taxes is shaped by the many-person Ramsey rule and
Tables 3 and 4 imply that demand for the goods preferred by taste group 1 should be less
discouraged. Figures 1 and 2 however show that consumption of taste group 3 differ from
the consumption of other groups.
Figure 1 gives the ratio of the individual consumption of a lower income class taste
group 1 household (in blue), 2 (in red) and 3 (in black) to the mean (over all possible
tastes) consumption of the lower income class, i.e., ξhjk/ξ
h for k = 1 and all j and h.
These consumptions coincide with the fictitious consumption of the upper income class
from taste group 1 (resp., 2 and 3) who would mimic a lower income class from this
same taste group 1 (resp., 2 and 3). Figure 1 also reports the income share devoted to
each category by a low income earner is reported into brackets. Individual expenditures
by group and discouragement indices are given in Table 6 in Appendix C. Taste group
3 consumption significantly departs from the average pattern. In particular this group
consumes much more Private transportation, which this is the most heavily discouraged
category. Similarly, Clothing is less consumed by taste group 3 and its discouragement
17
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index is about 0. On the other hand, Health is relatively preferred by taste groups 1 and 3
and the demand for this category is encouraged by the tax system: Ramsey considerations
then overcome incentive considerations.
Figure 2 reproduces the same exercise for the upper income class and provides similar
insights. The large positive excess consumption of Private transportation by taste group 3
would call for a further discouragement by the GST.
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Figure 1: Lower class consumption
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A Crawford-Pendakur taste groups
Table 5: Crawford-Pendakur taste groups
(ref: Taste group 1) Taste group 2 Taste group 3
Age 0.0001 0.001
(−0.003, 0.003) (−0.002, 0.004)
Urban (ref: rural) 0.056 0.059
(−0.037, 0.149) (−0.038, 0.156)
Housing tenure (ref: tenancy)
Mortgaged owner occupancy 0.082 0.032
(−0.015, 0.180) (−0.072, 0.136)
Outright owner occupancy −0.146∗∗ −0.066
(−0.249, −0.044) (−0.174, 0.041)
Type of family (ref: Single)
Childless Family −0.028 0.106
(−0.130, 0.074) (−0.001, 0.214)
Single Parent Family −0.162∗ 0.129
(−0.308, −0.015) (−0.020, 0.279)
Couple with children −0.115∗ −0.022
(−0.223, −0.007) (−0.138, 0.095)
Other extended family −0.014 0.024
(−0.155, 0.127) (−0.128, 0.177)
Education (ref: Primary education)
Secondary education 0.009 −0.099
(−0.100, 0.117) (−0.211, 0.014)
Partial post-secondary education 0.030 −0.015
(−0.107, 0.167) (−0.156, 0.127)
Complete post-secondary education 0.012 −0.093
(−0.111, 0.134) (−0.221, 0.035)
University 0.091 −0.153∗∗
(−0.024, 0.206) (−0.275, −0.032)
Region (Ref: Ontario)
Atlantic Canada1 −0.247∗∗∗ 0.024
(−0.369, −0.125) (−0.109, 0.157)
British Columbia 0.112 0.110
(−0.030, 0.255) (−0.049, 0.269)
Canadian Prairies2 −0.191∗∗∗ 0.097
(−0.307, −0.075) (−0.031, 0.224)
Quebec −0.196∗∗ −0.178∗
(−0.337, −0.054) (−0.337, −0.020)
Constant −0.245∗ −0.650∗∗∗
(−0.473, −0.017) (−0.894, −0.406)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 26,098.470 26,098.470
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Confidence intervals at the 10% level
1. New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, and Nova Scotia
2. Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Yukon, Nunavut, and Northwest Territories
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B Consumption patterns
Consumption patterns of the three taste groups are represented in Figure B. A more
detailed description is given in Table 6. In Figure B consumption of taste group 1 is chosen
as reference. The vertical axis reports the ratio between (1) the sales share of a given
product out of total expenditure per household of group 2 and (2) the same share per
household of the reference group 1. The horizontal axis has a similar interpretation, but
it applies to group 3 rather than group 2. A point located in the 45-degree line therefore
indicates that (the share of) consumption of a given category is the same for groups 2 and
3. The horizontal (resp. vertical) line at 1 indicates that the consumption is identical for
groups 1 and 3 (resp. 2). The largest differences between groups 2 and 3 concern Private
transport and Education. Group 2 consumes much more Housing than group 1, and much
less Durables and Leisure services. Finally, group 3 consumes much more Education and
Private transport than group 1, and much less Durables, Clothing and Leisure services.
The red point in Figure B gives the relative incomes (total net expenditures) of the
three sub-populations: Group 2 is the richest and group 3 the poorest sub-population.
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C AIDS demand
Demand is assumed to fit the Almost Ideal Demand System specification used by Deaton
and Muellbauer [11] (see eq. (8) and (9) in Deaton and Muellbauer [11]). It is estimated
using the functions aidsEst and aidsElas from R package micEconAids. This Appendix
provides the matrix of estimated price elasticity of aggregate compensated demand used in
(13) and the income effects for each group used in (18).
Table 7: Price elasticity of compensated aggregate demand
Price Food Alc Cloth Hous Equip Health PrivT PubT Com Rec Educ Rest Misc
Quantity
Food −2.96 0.01 0.15 0.27 −0.11 0.19 1.51 0.08 0.16 0.22 −0.34 0.55 0.27
Alc 0.08 −4.23 −0.54 1.28 0.60 0.48 1.59 −0.27 0.21 −0.63 0.51 −0.74 1.67
Cloth 0.32 −0.23 −1.84 0.23 0.52 −0.04 1.11 −0.00 −0.58 −0.21 −0.12 0.31 0.54
Hous 0.13 0.13 0.05 −1.89 0.13 0.11 0.55 0.08 0.01 0.33 0.02 0.22 0.15
Equip −0.17 0.18 0.36 0.39 −3.99 −0.16 0.38 0.19 −0.11 0.31 0.30 0.18 2.13
Health 0.95 0.47 −0.09 1.11 −0.52 −4.86 1.45 −0.61 0.33 0.23 0.70 −0.41 1.25
PrivT 1.14 0.24 0.38 0.82 0.19 0.22 −5.96 0.42 0.09 0.38 0.32 0.52 1.24
PubT 0.63 −0.43 −0.00 1.19 1.00 −0.99 4.50 −4.07 0.64 0.22 0.24 −1.23 −1.70
Com 0.67 0.17 −1.14 0.04 −0.30 0.28 0.52 0.34 −1.89 1.70 0.05 −0.32 −0.13
Rec 0.30 −0.17 −0.13 0.88 0.28 0.06 0.67 0.04 0.54 −3.32 0.10 0.14 0.61
Educ −3.19 0.96 −0.52 0.32 1.85 1.34 4.06 0.26 0.12 0.71 −6.45 0.17 0.37
Rest 1.38 −0.37 0.36 1.09 0.31 −0.21 1.75 −0.39 −0.19 0.26 0.05 −3.90 −0.13
Misc 0.20 0.23 0.18 0.21 0.99 0.18 1.15 −0.15 −0.02 0.31 0.03 −0.04 −3.27
Table 8: Income elasticity by group
Food Alc Cloth Hous Equip Health PrivT PubT Com Rec Educ Rest Misc
Quantity
Taste group 1
Low income 0.84 0.82 1.11 0.71 1.02 1.10 1.54 0.63 0.79 1.11 1.46 1.20 1.38
High income 0.57 0.68 1.12 0.84 1.11 0.70 1.37 1.32 0.56 1.21 1.99 1.02 0.91
Taste group 2
Low income 0.74 0.71 1.20 0.75 1.04 1.03 1.52 0.84 0.75 1.18 1.75 1.29 1.41
High income 0.52 0.43 1.19 0.81 1.16 0.70 1.32 1.23 0.59 1.27 2.01 1.09 0.95
Taste group 3
Low income 0.71 1.11 1.10 0.66 1.10 1.04 1.62 0.59 0.70 1.21 2.00 1.31 1.41
High income 0.54 0.59 1.10 0.71 1.04 0.56 1.55 1.24 0.54 1.16 1.91 1.04 0.95
D Total federal and provincial tax rates
The total commodity tax rate is the GST rate in Alberta and in Yukon, Northwest Terri-
tories, and Nunavut; the sum of the GST and a Provincial rate (PST) in British Columbia,
Manitoba and Saskatchewan; the sum of the GST and Quebec Sales Tax (QST) in Quebec;
while the Harmonized Sales Tax (HST) applies in other provinces.6 The current total tax
6Detailed information can be obtained at http://www.taxtips.ca/salestaxes/salestaxrates.htm.
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rates range from 5% (in provinces and territories where only the GST applies) to 14.975%
in Quebec and 15% in Nova Scotia. Tables 4 and 9 apply the (time) average total tax rate
to the tax base given in the main text.
Table 9: Total federal and provincial taxes
Taste group j 1 2 3
Income class k Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
consolidated social weights b∗jk/njk (in Canadian Dollars)
Whole sample 1.84 1.47 1.34 1.40 −0.95 −0.39
Conservative Party 2.09 1.52 0.21 1.22 0.13 −0.28
Liberal Party 1.91 1.75 1.09 0.98 −0.89 −0.34
Incentive correction n˜jkβ˜jk (in Canadian Dollars)
Whole sample −0.14 −0.05 −0.01 −0.03 0.29 0.19
Conservative Party −0.16 −0.12 0.10 −0.02 0.12 0.20
Liberal Party −0.16 −0.10 0.04 0.04 0.29 0.17
E Equivalent scales adjustment
In the paper the social weights have been estimated at the household level without any
adjustment for family size. Families of each taste group comprise 1.5 consumption units in
average. However family size may differ across income classes. This happens in particular
within taste group 1. In this group rich households have more children than the low income
class households. Table 10 provides social weight estimates applying an equivalent scale
adjustment to family expenditures. They are obtained from the whole 14 year sample, with
tax rates set equal to the sum of federal and provincial rates (as in Remark 3). We have
considered two alternative procedures. In both procedures expenditures are divided by the
number of consumption units in the household.7
In the first procedure (option 1) demand functions are reestimated maintaining the
composition of the 6 groups unchanged. The results can consequently be directly compared
to those given in (the first row of) Table 4.
This procedure is not entirely satisfactory since the equivalent scale correction implies
changes in income classes within each taste group. An household with two income earners
may for instance be classified in the upper income class in the absence of equivalent scale
7Statistics Canada refers to the Low Income Measure (LIM) equivalence scale where the oldest person
in the family receives a factor of 1, all other members aged 16 and over each receive a factor of 0.4, and
those under age 16 receive a factor of 0.3.
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adjustment, while it belongs to an adult equivalent low income class. The second procedure
(option 2) takes into account the actual adult equivalent income classes and reestimates
demand functions for these new groups. The resulting estimates cannot be compared to
those given in Table 4.
Table 10: Equivalent scale correction
Taste group j 1 2 3
Income class k Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Option 1
consolidated weight 2.41 1.21 −0.85 2.15 0.62 −0.88
Incentive correction −0.27 0.01 0.33 −0.13 0.09 0.25
Intrinsic weight 2.41 1.27 1.30 2.15 1.32 1.25
Option 2
consolidated weight 2.53 1.18 −0.84 1.91 0.33 −0.49
Incentive correction −0.31 0.02 0.32 −0.10 0.12 0.20
Intrinsic weight 2.53 1.25 1.28 1.91 1.29 1.22
Notes: Estimates are from the whole 14 year sample, using total (federal and provincial) taxes.
consolidated and intrinsic weights coincide when the incentive correction is negative.
The lower income class of taste group 1 still appears as socially favored. The equivalent
scale adjustment yields a higher weight for the low size poor households in taste group 1.
There is no significant changes otherwise, except a higher weight put of the high income
earners of taste group 2. Incentive issues still concern taste group 3. Indirect taxes are
detrimental to this last taste group.
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